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Abstract
This paper analyses the e¤ect of integration on growth when countries have
di¤erent preferences. It describes a two-country two-sector model, with the
…rst sector producing the homogeneous good and the second sector producing
a di¤erentiated good, which is divided in a …rst-class goods group and a second-
class group. The only innovative sector is the one producing …rst-class goods.
In autarchy, both countries produce …rst and second-class goods. Opening up
to trade, with non-zero transport costs, induces countries’ specialisation ac-
cording to their home-market comparative advantage. In these circumstances,
transportation costs a¤ect the growth rate.
There are three main …ndings. First, integration has a positive e¤ect on
growth, but there is a discontinuity at free trade. Second, integration with a
country with a smaller market for the innovative good may increase growth
more than integration with a country with symmetric preferences. Finally, the
e¤ect of integration on growth is higher the larger the size of the home market
advantage and the smaller is the extent of spillovers between countries.
Keywords: home market comparative advantage; integration; intra-industry
trade; endogenous growth.
JEL classi…cation: F12; F15; F43; O41.
1 Introduction
The literature on trade and growth emphasised four di¤erent mechanisms through
which economic integration might a¤ect growth: scale, knowledge spillovers, compe-
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1tition and specialisation e¤ects.1 On the basis of these e¤ects, economic literature
generally predicts that integration between similar countries is growth-enhancing;
while integration between di¤erent countries may be detrimental for growth. This
is because in the former case the scale, knowledge spillovers and competition e¤ects
of integration dominate, and these e¤ects are likely to have a positive impact on
growth. First, integration enlarges the size of the market in which each …rm oper-
ates. This scale e¤ect increases the expected reward for investment in R&D. As a
result, …rms invest more in innovation, and the growth rate increases. Second, inter-
national trade facilitates knowledge spillovers. Higher knowledge spillovers increase
productivity in the research sector and this increases growth (Grossman and Help-
man, 1991). Third, competition encourages investment toward new products rather
than imitation, it eliminates R&D redundancy, thus increasing growth (Rivera-Batiz
and Romer, 1991a).
In contrast, when integration occurs between di¤erent countries, specialisation
according to a country’s comparative advantage may reduce growth. In fact, if spe-
cialisation shifts resources from research into production, technological innovation
may slow down.
So far, economic literature on trade and growth has analysed the e¤ects of integra-
tion when countries are symmetric and when they have di¤erent factor endowments.2
Moreover, it has generally studied the e¤ects of integration on growth by comparing
autarchy with the free trade equilibrium.3
This paper discusses how integration a¤ects a country’s growth rate when coun-
tries have di¤erent preferences. In particular, it analyses the e¤ect of a progressive
1For a review see Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Grossman and Rogo¤, 1995; Obsfeld and Rogo¤,
1996; and Aghion and Howitt, 1998.
2In order to focus on the specialisation e¤ect of integration, Grossman and Helpman (1991)
assume a Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade where spillovers are national in scope.
3The only exception is the paper by Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991b), where integration is mod-
elled as the progressive reduction of the tari¤ rate.
2reduction in transport costs on growth in an intra-industry trade model, where the
pattern of trade is pinned down by the market access advantage. The contribution
of this paper to the development of economic theory of trade and growth is twofold.
First, this paper introduces in the literature on trade liberalisation and growth a new
channel through which integration might a¤ect the growth rate: the home market
e¤ect. Second, it provides an example of how misleading the simple comparison of
free trade and autarchy can be in the analysis of the e¤ect of trade.
The home market e¤ect has been analysed by the literature on intra-industry
trade. In his pioneer paper, Krugman (1980) shows that when countries di¤er in size
and trade is costly, trade patterns are pinned down by the home market advantage.
In fact, when there are trade costs, production of the di¤erentiated good concentrates
in the country, where the demand is larger. This is because …rms will try to avoid
transport costs on the larger part of their sales. Therefore, this country will become
a net exporter of the di¤erentiated good.4
Using a partial equilibrium model of intra-industry trade, Krugman and Venables
(1990) analyse what are the static e¤ects of trade liberalisation. They show that, as
trade barriers fall, the pattern of localisation of production between the two trading
countries is non-linear. In autarchy each country produces a volume of each class of
goods proportional to its expenditure; as transport costs fall production concentrates
in the country with the home market advantage. As the two countries approach a
free trade regime, the home market advantage disappears and production randomises
between the two countries. So, under free trade, each country produces each class of
goods in proportion to its expenditure.
This paper argues that there are also dynamic implications of the home market ad-
4Note that in a more recent paper, Weder (1995) has re…ned Krugman’ s result. Weder shows
that, when there are two types of di¤erentiated good, the pattern of trade is no longer determined
by the home market advantage but by the comparative home market advantage; i.e. each country
will export the type of di¤erentiated good for which it has the relatively larger domestic demand.
3vantage e¤ect. The rationale is as follows. Growth theory has shown that, when there
are spillovers between countries, there is a steady state at which di¤erent countries
grow at a common growth rate. When, knowledge spillovers tend to zero, this growth
rate is determined by the country with the larger labour force (Feenstra, 1996). We
argue that in a world characterised by a multiplicity of sectors, some of which are
non-progressive (i.e. there is no learning-by-doing implied by the production of these
goods), the common growth rate at which countries grow will be determined by the
labour force employed in the progressive sector (i.e. knowledge is a by-product of
manufacturing in this sector) in the country where this sector is larger. Therefore, it
is rational to expect that the non-linear pattern of the e¤ect of lower transport costs
on localisation of production re‡ects onto the growth rate.
In order to focus on the home market e¤ect of integration, this paper assumes that
countries only di¤er in their preferences over the di¤erentiated good. It describes a
two-country two-sector model, with one sector producing a homogeneous good and
the other one producing a di¤erentiated good. There are two types of di¤erentiated
good; a …rst-class goods group and a second-class group. First-class goods are the
only innovative goods. An economy’s growth rate is determined by the size of this
progressive sector. In autarchy, the size of the progressive sector is determined by
the size of the home market for it. If trade is possible, with non-zero transport costs,
production of …rst-class goods will concentrate in the country with the larger demand
for it. The size of the progressive sector in this country will be more than proportional
to the size of the home market. This will trigger higher growth.
There are three main …ndings. First, this paper shows that integration is growth-
enhancing also when countries have di¤erent preferences. Yet, in these circumstances,
there is a discontinuity at free trade. When transport costs fall to zero, the growth
rate falls too. Free trade removes …rms’ advantage to locate in the country with the
4larger domestic market. Firms randomise between countries, so the positive e¤ect of
specialisation on growth disappears.
This result is new in the literature on trade and growth. Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991b) also …nd a non-linear e¤ect of integration on growth. In their model, however,
integration has a U-shaped e¤ect on growth. This is the result of the action of two
opposing forces. On the one hand, higher tari¤s reduce returns to human capital in
the research sector, thus decreasing …rms’ incentive to innovate. On the other hand,
they also reduce the marginal productivity of human capital in the manufacturing
sector,5 thus pushing labour from the manufacturing to the research sector. The
net e¤ect of higher tari¤s on the growth rate depends on which of these two forces
dominates. If the fall in marginal productivity of human capital in the manufacturing
sector o¤sets the fall in the return to innovation, trade restrictions increase the growth
rate.
Second, this paper shows that trade between countries with di¤erent preferences
might be more bene…cial in terms of growth than trade between similar countries.
This is because asymmetric preferences induce specialisation and this in turn trigger
growth.
Finally, this paper shows that the extentto which integration will a¤ect a country’s
growth rate will depend ceteris paribus on the size of the home market advantage and
the extent of spillovers across countries. In particular, the more preferences di¤er
across countries and the lower is the degree of spillovers across countries (as long as
it is positive) the larger is the positive impact of a reduction in transportation costs
on growth.
5This latter e¤ect is due to the fact that trade restrictions reduce the quantity of imported
intermediate inputs used in manufacturing.
52 The Model
Consider a two-country two-sector model with only one scarce factor of production:
labour. One sector (agriculture) produces a homogeneous good (good Y ), the other
sector (manufacturing) a di¤erentiated good (good C). The good Y is freely traded;6
while trade of the di¤erentiated good is subject to an iceberg type transport cost.
Trade liberalisation occurs via the progressive reduction of such cost.
Moreover, there are two types of di¤erentiated goods: …rst-class and second-class
goods. First-class goods are the innovative goods, whose design is the outcome of re-
search activity. Second-class goods are imitation goods. First-class goods are denoted
with a hat, second-class goods with a double hat. So, b c1; b c2;:::b cn denote consumption
levels in the domestic country of varieties from 1 to n of …rst-class goods produced at
home, while b b c1;b b c2;:::b b cn denote consumption levels of di¤erent varieties of second-class
goods. A star will denote domestic consumption of goods produced abroad.
We assume Bertrand competition in the product market. On the capital market,
…rms are 100% …nanced by households. Firms invest in R&D and use the returns of
their investments to pay dividends to consumers.
2.1 Households
On the demand side we formalise consumers consumption decisions as a four stage
budgeting problem. In the …rst stage, consumers decide their aggregate consumption
path; then, they allocate consumption between the di¤erentiated and the homoge-
neous good; third, they decide consumption of each of the two classes of goods; …nally,
they allocate consumption between the di¤erent varieties of each class. In order to
avoid aggregation problems, we also assume homogeneous agents.
6This is the usual simplifying assumption in the literature of trade with di¤erentiated production.
For a criticism of this assumption refer to Davis (1997).
6In the …rst stage, consumers maximise an intertemporal utility function of the
form:7
U( e C(:)) =
1 Z
0
e
¡½tlog( e C(t))dt (1.1)
subject to the instantaneous budget constraint that investment in new assets is
equal to labour and dividend income minus expenditure:8
¢
D (t) = w(t)L + rD(t) ¡ e P(t) e C(t) (1.2)
where e P(t) e C(t) is total expenditure, D denotes consumers’ assets, w is the wage
rate, r is the interest rate (that we assume to be constant over time), ½ > 0 is the
constant pure rate of time preference (the individual discount factor). e C(t) is the in-
stantaneous utility function, describing individuals preferences over the di¤erentiated
and the homogeneous goods.
The solution for this maximisation problem is the well known Ramsey formula.
The optimal time path of consumption is:
:
e C
e C
+
:
P
e P
= r ¡ ½ (1.3)
This condition implies that the instantaneous growth rate of nominal expenditure
equals the di¤erence between the interest rate and the subjective discount rate. There
is no monetary instrument in the economy. Therefore, any nominal variable can
be chosen as numeraire. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Feenstra
7For simplicity, we specify a logarithmic utility function. A more general function is U(e C(:)) =
1 R
0
e¡½t(e C(t))1¡¯
1 ¡ ¯
dt , which allows for di¤erent values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
1=¯: Speci…cally, if ¯ = 0 consumers are risk neutral, if ¯ > 0 consumers are risk adverse. The
logarithmic utility function is a special case of this set of utility functions with ¯ = 1:
8This is equivalent to the intertemporal budget constraint that the present discounted value of
expenditure must be equal to the present discounted value of labour and dividend income plus initial
wealth.
7(1996), we normalise prices at any point in time so that nominal expenditure remains
constant.
In the second stage, at each instant in time t, consumers, taking as given this time
path of expenditure, allocate their total expenditure, e P(t) e C(t); between the di¤eren-
tiated and the homogeneous good. The optimal consumption bundle is obtained by
maximising the instantaneous utility function:
e C = C(:)
®Y
1¡® (1.4)
subject to:
e P e C = CP + Y PY (1.5)
where C is the utility derived from the consumption of the di¤erentiated good and
Y is the demand for the homogeneous good.
The maximisation of the instantaneous utility function, e C, yields the following
expressions for the shares of total spending allocated to the two goods:
PC = ® e P e C (1.6)
PY Y = (1 ¡ ®) e P e C (1.7)
e P is a price index for the composite good, e C, and it is de…ned as the minimum
expenditure needed to consume a unit of such good:
e P ´
µP
®
¶® µ PY
1 ¡ ®
¶1¡®
(1.8)
Note that the Cobb-Douglas structure of preferences abstracts from cross-price
e¤ects and results in constant sectorial expenditure over time. In addition, PY is the
8price of the homogeneous good. Since the homogeneous good is traded costlessly its
price is the same in both countries.
In the third stage, the demand for each variety of the composite good is found
by maximising the sub-utility function, C(:): This represents a Cobb-Douglas utility
function over two types of di¤erentiated goods: …rst and second-class goods. It is
de…ned as:
C =
³
b C
´° µ
b b C
¶1¡°
(1.9)
where b C and
b b C denote the utility derived from the consumption of …rst- and second-
class goods respectively. Consumers maximise the utility derived by the consumption
of the di¤erentiated good, subject to the budget constraint
b P b C +
b b P
b b C = PC (1.10)
where b P and
b b P are price indexes of …rst-class and second-class goods. The solution
of the third stage maximisation problems yields:
b P b C = °PC and
b b P
b b C = (1 ¡ °)PC (1.11)
where, as in equation (1.6) PC = ® e P e C is the expenditure on di¤erentiated goods
and 0 < ° < 1 is the percentage of expenditure on di¤erentiated goods relative to
the …rst-class goods. Similarly, for the foreign country. The domestic country has a
home market advantage over …rst-class goods when ° > °¤: Finally, P is de…ned as:
P ´
Ã b P
°
!° 0
@
b b P
1 ¡ °
1
A
1¡°
(1.12)
There is now a fourth stage in which consumers decide consumption over each
speci…c variety of each of the two classes of the di¤erentiated good. The instantaneous
utilities deriving from consumption of …rst- and second-class goods are, respectively:
9b C(:) =
0
@
b N X
i=1
b c
µ
i +
b N¤ X
j=1
b c
¤µ
j
1
A
1
µ
(1.13)
and
b b C(:) =
0
B
@
b b N X
i=1
b b c
µ
i +
b b N
¤
X
j=1
b b c
¤µ
j
1
C
A
1
µ
(1.14)
where b cj is the demand by a consumer in the domestic country for the variety j of
the …rst-class di¤erentiated good produced in the foreign country, 0 < µ < 1, so that
" =
1
1 ¡ µ
> 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between pairs of variety of
the same product9 and c N denotes the potential number of varieties of …rst-class good
produced in the domestic country (we will denote the actual number of produced
goods with n). Moreover, ¿ is the level of transport cost. Transport costs will be
assumed to be of a iceberg type, that is only a fraction 1=¿ of the product shipped
in the domestic country arrives at its destination in the foreign country. Henceforth,
¿ = 1 under free trade and tends to in…nity under autarchy.
At each moment of time, consumers maximise their instantaneous utilities as
expressed in equations (1.13) and (1.14) subject respectively to the following budget
constraints:
X
i
b pib ci +
X
j
(¿ b p
¤
j)b c
¤
j ￿ b P b C (1.15)
X
i
b b pi
b b ci +
X
j
(¿b b p
¤
j)b b c
¤
j ￿
b b P
b b C (1.16)
9" must be grater that 1 in order to make sense of monopolistic competition. If " < 1 the marginal
revenue is less than zero. In order for the product varieties to be imperfect substitute µ is required
to be < 1.
10where b p¤
j is the price for the variety j of the …rst-class good, produced abroad,
charged by the producer (f.o.b.) in the domestic country. Note that arbitrage guar-
antees that f.o.b. prices are the same for the domestic and the foreign country.
Utility maximisation yields the following demand functions’ in the home country
for the variety i and j of …rst-class and second-class goods, respectively, domestically
produced:
b ci =
µ b pi
b P
¶¡"
b C (1.17)
b b cj =
0
@
b b pj
b b P
1
A
¡"
b b C
and for goods produced in the foreign country:
b c
¤
j =
µ¿ b p¤
i
b P
¶¡"
b C (1.18)
b b c
¤
j =
0
@¿b b p
¤
i
b b P
1
A
¡"
b b C
Similar demand functions can be derived for the foreign country.
The price index , b P; is de…ned as the minimum expenditure needed to buy a unit
of the composite good b C, so that:
b P ´
0
@
X
i
b p
1¡"
i +
X
j
(¿ b p
¤
j)
1¡"
1
A
1
1¡"
(1.19)
Similarly,
b b P is the minimum expenditure needed to buy a unit of the composite
good
b b C:
112.2 Firms
Firms behaviour is formalised as a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in prices and
technologies. Firms choose their R&D expenditure and simultaneously set prices in
order to maximise the present discounted ‡ow of future pro…ts, taking as given the
technology constraints and consumers’ demand.
2.2.1 Technology
The homogeneous good is produced subject to a CRS technology using labour LY
only. Assuming a constant marginal productivity of labour equal for each …rm in the
sector, normalisation of this to 1 yields the following form of the production function
for the homogeneous good:
LY = Y (2.1)
As far as the di¤erentiated products are concerned, …rst, we assume that …rms
compete monopolistically on the product market. Second, we assume that produc-
tivity in the manufacturing sector is given (so there is no process innovation). Third,
innovation only occurs through the introduction of new di¤erentiated …rst-class goods.
The invention of a new …rst-class goods requires that …rms invest in R&D. The
innovation technology in the domestic country is given by:
:
b n= »KLZ (2.2)
where
:
b n is the variation in the number of varieties of …rst-class products, »K is
the productivity of research, and K; which denotes public knowledge, is de…ned as
follows:
K = b n + Áb n
¤ (2.3)
12As the number of varieties increases, the cost associated with the introduction of
a new variety,
w
»K
; decreases. This maintains the incentive to innovate and is what
determines a constant growth rate.
Production of …rst-class goods in the home country, b xi; occurs according to the
following technology function:
b xi = b hb LXi (2.4)
The production function of second-class di¤erentiated goods, b b xi; is:
b b xi =
b b hi
b b LXi (2.5)
Moreover, …rms producing second-class goods sustain a …xed cost
b b LF in order
to start production: In other words, average costs decline as output increases. This
…xed cost will determine the number of …rms producing second-class goods in the
market. Moreover, the number of …rms in the market will equal the number of goods
produced. This is because, given the …xed cost,
b b LF; it will be more convenient for
each new …rm entering the market to produce a new good rather than competing
with an existing …rm in the production of an existing good.
2.3 Producers’ Behaviour
Price Decisions
We assume that producers engage in monopolistic competition and that there is
a large number of …rms in the market. Therefore, prices will be a constant mark-up
over marginal costs. The price of a variety i of the …rst-class good can be written as:
b pi =
"
" ¡ 1
w
b h
(3.1)
13where " is the …rms’ perceived elasticity of substitution. Similarly for the foreign
country. We assume that …rms are symmetric within each country, therefore b pi = b pj;
8 i;j: Moreover, free trade in the homogeneous sector guarantees that wages are the
same in the two countries, i.e. w = w¤. Assuming that technology is symmetric across
countries, i.e. b h = b h¤; wage equality implies that b pi = b p¤
i; and alike for second-class
goods. Finally, in order to simplify the model, we assume that marginal productivity
of labour is the same in the production of …rst- and second-class goods and across
countries, i.e. b h =
b b h = h: This implies that prices of the two classes of goods are the
same: b p = b b p = p:
R&D Decisions
Let’s now turn to …rms’ decisions to invest in research and development. At each
moment in time, the development of a new …rst-class good will occur until the present
discounted value of pro…ts generated by the production of the new good equals the
expenditure in R&D needed to introduce a new product,10 that is:
Z 1
0
e
¡rt(
1
" ¡ 1
w
h
c X
b n
)dt =
w
»K
(3.2)
where c X = b nb xi. It will be convenient to measure labour in terms of e¢ciency
units in R&D, so that » = 1:
Di¤erentiating the long-run zero-pro…t condition (3.2), we obtain the no-arbitrage
condition:11
10Using equation (3.1), pro…ts at each point in time can be expressed as: (p¡
w
h
)b xi =
1
" ¡ 1
w
h
b xi:
From R&D technology (2.1),
:
b n= 1, imply b LZ =
1
»K
; therefore the expenditure in R&D that
generates one unit of output is
w
»K
:
11Note that this is the general no arbitrage condition: ¼+
:
v= rv where v =
R 1
0 e¡rt¼(t)dt: In our
model v =
w
b n + Áb n¤ and ¼ =
1
" ¡ 1
w
h
b X
b n
:
141
" ¡ 1
w
h
c X
b n
+
2
4
: w
w
¡
:
b n +Á
:
b n
¤
b n + Áb n¤
3
5 w
b n + Áb n¤ = r
w
b n + Áb n¤ (3.3)
Equation (3.3) says that the sum of pro…ts obtained by investing a unit worth
output of R&D (the …rst term on the LHS) plus the capital gains from this investment
(the second term on the LHS) must equal the return from investing the same amount
in a riskless asset.
Production Decisions
Free entry in the production of second-class goods ensures that in this sector, at
each moment in time, pro…ts are equal to zero. If pro…ts are positive, new …rms will
enter and pro…ts will fall. Setting pro…ts equal to zero and using the price setting
rule (3.1), we get the following expression for the output of a representative …rm i
producing second-class products:
b b xi = h(" ¡ 1)
b b LF (3.4)
2.4 Equilibrium
So far we have described consumers and producers’ behaviour. The model is closed
by adding the following equilibrium conditions: the labour market clearing condition,
the product market clearing condition and the overall budget constraint. Using the
labour market clearing condition, we derive an expression of the steady state growth
rate as a function of labour allocated to the …rst-class good sector. Then, the product
market clearing condition and the overall budget constraint are used to express the
growth rate of the economy as a function of the parameters of the model only.
152.4.1 Steady-state: the role of labour allocated to the …rst-class good
sector
The labour market clearing condition requires that the sum of labour employed in the
development of new varieties and in the production of …rst-class goods plus labour
employed in the production of second-class goods plus labour employed in the produc-
tion of the traditional good Y equals the country’s labour endowment. Analytically,
this implies:
:
b n
K
+
c X
h
+ b b n(
b b x
h
+
b b LF) + LY = b L +
b b L + LY = L (4.1.1)
where b L = LZ + b LX is the labour employed in the …rst-class good sector (research
labour plus manufacturing labour) and
b b L is the labour employed in the second-class
goods sector.
Let g =
:
b n
b n
, then total labour employed in …rst-class good sector can be expressed
as:
g
1
1 + Á
b n¤
b n
+
c X
h
= b L (4.1.2)
Following Feenstra (1996) and using the labour market clearing condition (4.1.1),
we can rewrite the no-arbitrage condition for the domestic country (3.3) as:12
g =
1
"
fb L(1 + Á
b n¤
b n
) ¡ (" ¡ 1)[r ¡
: w
w
¡ (g ¡ g
¤)(1 ¡
b n
b n + Áb n¤)]g (4.1.3)
where the term b L(1 + Á
b n¤
b n
) re‡ects the “e¤ective” labour force for determining
R&D activity. Note that a higher
b n¤
b n
increases e¤ective labour force in the domestic
country, similarly, mutatis mutandis, for the foreign country . Equation (4.1.3) and
its companion equation for the foreign country imply that as t ! 1 the rate of
12Equation (4.1.3) is obtained substituting (4.1.1) and (4.1.2) into (3.3) and rearranging.
16innovation in both countries converge to a constant rate of innovation g = g¤ = g:
This result is explained by Feenstra (1996) as follows. Suppose that the steady state
rates of innovation di¤er for the two countries. Assume that the foreign country, say,
grows at a faster long-run growth rate, i.e. g¤ > g: Then, as t ! 1;
b n¤
b n
! 1: With
Á > 0 the e¤ective labour force in the domestic country would tend to in…nity. This
would be consistent with a …nite steady-state growth rate in the domestic country
only if the real interest rate, r¡
: w
w
; also tends to in…nity, namely if wages at home fall
rapidly. However, this situation has to be ruled out. This is because the equilibrium
in the homogenous sector guarantees that wages are the same in the two countries.
Therefore, their real interest rate is also the same. A real interest rate that tends to
in…nity is not consistent with a …nite growth rate in the foreign country.
Therefore, in equilibrium g = g¤ = g: This condition requires that in equilibrium:
b L(1 + Á
b n¤
b n
) = b L
¤(1 + Á
b n
b n¤) (4.1.4)
i.e. the e¤ective labour force in the two countries is the same, that the relative
proportion of …rst-class goods produced in the two countries is:
b n
b n¤ =
1
2Áb L¤
￿
(b L ¡ b L
¤) +
q
(b L¤ ¡ b L)2 + 4b Lb L¤Á
2
¸
(4.1.5)
and that the worldwide growth rate g is:13
g =
1
2"
￿
(b L + b L
¤) +
q
(b L¤ ¡ b L)2 + 4b Lb L¤Á
2 ¡ 2(" ¡ 1)½
¸
(4.1.6)
Note that, unlike Feenstra (1996), the steady-state growth rate is now a function
of employment in the …rst-class good sector rather than of the population in the
13Equation (4.1.6) has been obtained using the optimal consumption path equation (1.3) and
substituting (4.1.5) into equation (4.1.3), after we have substitute r = ½ and
:
w
w
= 0 into (4.1.3).
Appendix A provides the proofs for these equalities. Moreover, note that there is a typo in Feenstra
(1996). The term Á
2 appears as Á in Feenstra’s paper.
17two countries. Therefore, the growth rate will depend on the allocation of labour
between the sectors producing …rst- and second-class goods. Since the allocation of
labour between the two sectors depends on the level of transport costs, it is rational
to expect that the steady state growth rate is a function of transport costs too.
In particular, note that as Á ! 0 , g ! [maxfb L; b L¤g¡("¡1)½]=". Feenstra (1996)
…nds that when there are knowledge spillovers, countries of di¤erent size grow at the
same growth rate. When Á ! 0, this growth rate is determined by the population
of the bigger country. In our context, this growth rate is determined by the level of
employment in the …rst-class good sector in the country where this sector is larger.
When Á = 1, g =
(b L + b L¤) ¡ (" ¡ 1)½
"
:
Furthermore, note that in a world characterised by di¤erent preferences over the
di¤erentiated good for the two countries, although the rate at which new products
are introduced in the market is the same for both countries, the rate of growth of
consumption di¤ers. In particular, for the domestic country:
¢
e C
e C
=
®°
" ¡ 1
g (4.1.7)
Since ° 6= °¤, consumption growth path will di¤er in the two countries.
2.4.2 Labour Allocation
The overall budget constraint for the economy is:
e P e C = PC + PY Y = wL + b nb ¦ (4.2.1)
Total expenditure in the domestic country is equal to the sum of labour income
and pro…ts generated in the …rst-class sector, b ¦:
18In equilibrium, labour market condition (4.1.2) holds and pro…ts of a …rm pro-
ducing …rst-class goods in the domestic country can be written in the form14:
b ¦ =
1
" ¡ 1
w
b L ¡ ag
b n
(4.2.2)
where a =
1
1 + Á
b n¤
b n
.
Using the equation of the overall budget constraint (4.2.1) and the expression
(4.2.2) for pro…ts, we can derive the following expressions for labour employed in the
production of the homogeneous good in the domestic country:15
LY = (1 ¡ ®)(L +
b L ¡ ag
" ¡ 1
) (4.2.3)
for labour employed in the production of …rst-class goods in the domestic country:
b L =
" ¡ 1
" ¡ ®
(®L +
1 ¡ ®
" ¡ 1
ag ¡ "
b b LF b b n) (4.2.4)
for labour employed in the second-class good sector in the domestic country:
b b L = (
b b LF +
b b x
h
)b b n = "
b b LF b b n (4.2.5)
and, similarly, for labour employed in the …rst-class good sector in the foreign
country:
b L
¤ =
" ¡ 1
" ¡ ®
(®L
¤ +
1 ¡ ®
" ¡ 1
bg ¡ "
b b LF b b n
¤
) (4.2.6)
where b =
1
1 + Á
b n
b n¤
:
14Instantaneous pro…ts of a …rm i, after initial R&D expenditure has been sustained are ¼i =
b pib xi ¡ wb LXi: Using (2.4) and (3.1), pro…ts can be rewritten as: ¼i =
w
h
1
" ¡ 1
b xi: Expression (4.2.2)
is obtained substituting (4.1.2) in this last expression for pro…ts.
15This expressions is obtained using the result (4.2.2), the conditions PY = w, Y = LY and
PY Y = (1 ¡ ®)e P e C in the economy budget constraint equation (4.2.1).
19In order to close the model, we need to …nd the expressions for b b n, b b n
¤
and
b n
b n¤:
In the next section we derive these expressions from the product market clearing
conditions for the …rst- and second-class good sectors.
2.4.3 Steady state number of goods produced in the two countries
The ratio b b n=b b n
¤
is determined by the product market clearing condition for the second-
class goods sector. This implies that the value of production equals the sum of
domestic and foreign expenditure. Analytically,
b b nb b pb b x = ®
2
4
b b nb b p
1¡"
b b nb b p
1¡"
+ b b n
¤
(¿b b p
¤
)1¡"
(1 ¡ °) e P e C +
b b n(¿b b p)1¡"
b b n
¤b b p
¤1¡"
+ b b n(¿b b p)1¡"
(1 ¡ °
¤) e P
¤ e C
¤
3
5
b b n
¤b b p
¤b b x
¤
= ®
2
4
b b n
¤b b p
¤1¡"
b b n
¤b b p
¤1¡"
+ b b n(¿b b p)1¡"
(1 ¡ °
¤) e P
¤ e C
¤ +
b b n
¤
(¿b b p
¤
)1¡"
b b nb b p
1¡"
+ b b n
¤
(¿b b p
¤
)1¡"
(1 ¡ °) e P e C
3
5
(4.2.7)
Note that the demand for foreign variety (the second term in the RHS of equation
(4.2.7)) is multiplied by ¿: This is because the demand facing the exporter must be
inclusive of the resources lost in transaction.16
In order to simplify the model, we consider a special case: consumption of the
second-class goods in the home country is a percentage, ± (where ± is a constant)
of labour income only. People who receive …rms’ dividends only consume …rst-class
goods and the homogeneous good. Therefore:
®° e P e C = ®(±wL + b nb ¦)
®(1 ¡ °) e P e C = ®(1 ¡ ±)wL
16(4.2.7) is obtained by substituting (1.6), (1.11),(1.14), (1.16), (1.19) into the market clearing
condition b b nAb b pAb b xA = b b nAb b pAb b cAA + b b nAb b pAb b cAB¿:
20Similarly for the foreign country. Note that this assumption is required to allow
a close form solution for the relative number of second-class goods produced in the
two countries.
We can therefore solve the above system of equations (4.2.7) to obtain:
b b n
b b n
¤ =
1 ¡ ±
1 ¡ ±
¤ ¡ ¿1¡"
1 ¡ ¿1¡" 1 ¡ ±
1 ¡ ±
¤
(4.2.8)
Equation (4.2.8) is de…ned for
1 ¡ ±
1 ¡ ±
¤ within the range [¿1¡";1=¿1¡"]. If the ratio
1 ¡ ±
1 ¡ ±
¤ is less than or equal to ¿1¡"; b b n equals zero. If the ratio is greater than or
equal to 1=¿1¡"; b b n
¤
= 0: The relative number of second-class goods produced in the
domestic country rises with an increase in the country relative demand
1 ¡ ±
1 ¡ ±
¤. Note
that as transport costs increase the range of non specialisation increases.
It follows that when ¿ > 1; if ± > ±
¤, then b b n < b b n
¤
and b L > b L¤: In other words,
even when countries are of the same size, if they have di¤erent preferences over the
two types of di¤erentiated goods, the production of one type of goods will concentrate
in the country where there is a comparatively higher domestic demand for that good.
This is because transport costs induce a market access advantage.
The equilibrium condition in the product market of …rst-class goods close the
model. It will be:
b nb pb x = ®
"
b nb p1¡"
b nb p1¡" + b n¤(¿ b p¤)1¡"° e P e C +
b n(¿ b p)1¡"
b n¤b p¤1¡" + b n(¿ b p)1¡"°
¤ e P
¤ e C
¤
#
(4.2.9)
and similarly for the foreign country.
Using the price setting rule, (3.1), the equation for total labour employed in the
production …rst-class good production, (4.1.2), the pro…t equation, (4.2.2), and the
assumption ®° e P e C = ®(±wL+ b nb ¦); the product market equilibrium condition (4.2.9)
21can be rewritten in the form:
b L©() =
®
"
(¿1¡" + c m)[±(" ¡ 1)L + b L©()] + ¿1¡"(1 + ¿1¡"c m)[±
¤(" ¡ 1)L + b L¤©()]
(¿1¡" + c m)(1 + ¿1¡"c m)
(4.2.10)
where c m =
b nB
b nA
; and ©(g; c m; b L; b L¤) =
Ã
1 ¡
g
(1 + Ác m)b L
!
=
0
B B
@1 ¡
g
(1 + Á
1
c m
)b L¤
1
C C
A:
Equations (4.1.5), (4.1.6), (4.2.4), (4.2.6), (4.2.8), (4.2.10) form the system of six
equations in six unknowns b L, b L¤;
b n
b n¤, b b n, b b n
¤
and g, which de…nes our model. This is
a system of non-linear equations. So, it requires a numerical solution. However, a
close form solution of the model is possible for the case of symmetric countries. The
next section will analyse the implications of the model for the e¤ects of integration
on growth.
2.5 Transport costs and the steady state growth rate
This section examines the impact of transport costs on the steady-state equilibrium.
In order to focus on the home market e¤ect, we carry out the analysis in two steps.
We begin by describing the e¤ects of transportation costs when countries are perfectly
symmetric, i.e. there is no home market e¤ect. Then, we extend the analysis to the
case of countries with di¤erent preferences over the two types of di¤erentiated goods.
Comparing the results obtained in these two cases will enable us to identify how the
home market e¤ect a¤ects growth.
2.5.1 Symmetric case
In order to abstract from home market e¤ects, in this subsection, we assume that
countries are symmetric. They share the same preferences over the di¤erentiated
goods, thus ± = ±
¤ and ° = °¤: Under these assumptions, the model described in the
22previous sections of this paper can be greatly simpli…ed and the analytical solution
for the growth rate can be worked out.
Writing out the equilibrium conditions, (4.1.5), (4.1.6), (4.2.4), (4.2.6), (4.2.8),
(4.2.10), of the model again; we have:
b b n = b b n
¤
=
®(1 ¡ °)
"
b b LF
(5.1.1)
and
b b n
b b n
¤ = 1 (5.1.2)
from the product market clearing conditions for second-class goods, (4.2.7)17 and
(4.2.8), respectively.
Using the labour market clearing conditions, (4.2.4) and (4.2.6)18, and long run
equilibrium condition on the relative number of …rst-class goods in the two countries,
(4.1.5), we obtain the result that under symmetry:
b L = b L
¤ (5.1.3)
and
b n
b n¤ = 1 (5.1.4)
Finally, it is possible to rewrite the equation of the product market clearing con-
dition for …rst-class goods, (4.2.10), as:
17In particular, (5.1.1) is obtained by using the price setting rule (3.1), the expression for output
per …rm (3.4) and the normalisation hypothesis e P e C = 1, in the product market clearing condition
for second class goods, (4.2.7).
18Note that equation (4.1.4) implies that
a
b L
=
b
b L¤: Substituting this equality, equations (4.2.4)
and (4.2.6) necessarily imply b L = b L¤
23b L =
g + ®(" ¡ 1)(1 + Á)±L
(1 + Á)(" ¡ ®)
(5.1.5)
and to rewrite the expression for the steady state growth rate, (4.1.6), in the form:
g =
1
"
³
b L(1 + Á) ¡ (" ¡ 1)½
´
(5.1.6)
The expression for the growth rate as a function of the exogenous parameters of
the model is derived by substituting equation (5.1.5) into (5.1.6). The result is:
g =
®±(1 + Á)L ¡ (" ¡ ®)½
" + 1 ¡ ®
(5.1.7)
The growth rate is positively correlated with the population size, the degree of
spillovers and the percentage of expenditure on …rst-class goods, but negatively cor-
related with the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods and the in-
tertemporal discount rate. In particular, for the two cases of no knowledge spillovers
and full knowledge spillovers commonly analysed by the literature on growth, we ob-
tain that as Á ! 0, g tends to
®±L ¡ (" ¡ ®)½
" + 1 ¡ ®
and as Á ! 1, g !
2®±L ¡ (" ¡ ®)½
" + 1 ¡ ®
:
The free ‡ow of ideas increases the growth rate. Note that the growth rate for Á ! 0
is also the growth rate of a closed economy.
However, the important point to notice is that transportation costs have no e¤ect
on the growth rate. This is because in our model the elasticity of export demand
is the same as the elasticity of domestic demand and it is independent of transport
costs. Thus, given that the two countries are perfectly symmetric, transportation
costs have no e¤ect on the output per …rm or on the number of …rms at any point in
time in either country or on the labour demanded for the production of second-class
goods. Since labour allocation between sectors of the economy does not chance, the
growth rate will not change.
24This result is consistent with that found by Krugman (1980). In his paper, Krug-
man shows that, in a two-country one-industry19 economy, transportation costs have
no e¤ect on prices, output per …rm or the number of …rms in either country. We
show that Krugman’ s result also holds for a symmetric two-country-two industry
economy. Moreover, we extend the analysis to the dynamic e¤ects of transport costs.
2.5.2 The home market e¤ect on the growth rate
In this section, we analyse the e¤ect of a reduction of transport costs on the equilib-
rium growth rate, in a world where there are two classes of di¤erentiated good (one
progressive sector producing …rst-class goods and one non-progressive sector pro-
ducing second-class goods), people’s preferences over these two classes di¤er across
countries, there are knowledge spillovers and trade is impeded by transport costs.
In this case there is no close form solution to our model. Equations (4.1.5),
(4.1.6), (4.2.4), (4.2.6), (4.2.8), (4.2.10) form a system of non linear equations in the
six unknowns: b L, b L¤;
b n
b n¤, b b n, b b n
¤
and g; that cannot be solved analytically. Thus,
comparative statics results are obtained by numerical simulations.20
We look at equilibria where there is incomplete specialisation, and we analyse
the impact of integration on growth. Moreover, we examine the role played by the
elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods, the extent of spillovers, the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, a greater home market advantage and the
level of …xed costs in the second-class good sector in determining the pattern of the
e¤ect of integration on growth, specialisation and production in the two countries.
The benchmark case assumes the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated
goods " = 30, the percentage of expenditure on di¤erentiated goods ® = 0:9; the
degree of spillovers between countries Á = 0:7; the intertemporal rate of discount
19Note that in a one-industry setup, if wages are not allowed to di¤er between countries, full
employment equilibrium condition wipes out any home market e¤ect.
20The model is simulated in GAUSS. The program is available from the author upon request.
25½ = 0:3; the …xed cost in the production function of second-class goods
b b LF = 0:5 and
population equal to 100 in both countries. Finally, it assumes that the percentage
of income spent on …rst-class goods ± = 0:6 and ±
¤ = 0:55 for the domestic and
the foreign country respectively. In presence of transport costs, these parameter
values imply that the domestic country has a home market comparative advantage
in the production of …rst-class goods, while the foreign country has a home market
comparative advantage for second-class goods. Note that, for these values of the
parameters, equation (5.1.7) predicts a growth rate equal 2.76 for the two symmetric
countries when ± = 0:6 and equal to 2.51 when ± = 0:55:
Figure I shows the impact of increasing transport costs on the steady -state world-
wide growth rate in the benchmark case. There are two important points to make.
First, there is a non-linear e¤ect of transport costs on the growth rate. As trans-
portation costs fall the growth rate increases. In Figure I, as transport costs fall
from 1:6 to 1:006 the growth rate increases from 2:74 to 2:98. However, when trans-
port costs are equal to 1 (i.e. under free trade) the growth rate equals 2:64. The
free trade growth rate is obtained by simulation of the system of equations (4.1.5),
(4.1.6), (4.2.4), (4.2.6), (4.2.10) and the market clearing equation:
b b n + b b n
¤
=
®
"
(2 ¡ ± ¡ ±
¤)L
LF
(5.2.1)
where equation (5.2.1), obtained by substituting (3.1) and (3.4) into (4.2.7), re-
places equation (4.2.8) in the equilibrium system of equations. This is because for
¿ = 1, equation (4.2.8) is not de…ned when countries have di¤erent preferences over
the di¤erentiated good.
26The non-linear e¤ect of integration on growth is due to the home market e¤ect.
The literature on static models of trade has shown that the home market advantage
has a non linear e¤ect on concentration. When transport costs are positive, …rms lo-
cate in the country with the larger home market. Under the conditions speci…ed in the
benchmark model, the foreign country has a home market advantage in second-class
goods. Therefore, as countries open up to trade, …rms producing second class goods
will concentrate abroad. The foreign country will be a net exporter of second-class
goods; while the domestic country will be a net importer of these goods. The opposite
pattern will occur in the home country. However, when trade is free, …rms have no
advantage in locating in the larger market. Production will randomise between the
two countries.
In this paper, the non linear e¤ect of integration on concentration is re‡ected in
27a non linear e¤ect of integration on growth. The rationale is as follows. As transport
costs fall, countries specialise according to their home market advantage. In our
model, concentration has two opposite e¤ects on the level of knowledge of the home
country, say. On the one hand, concentration of production of …rst-class goods in
the home country increases domestic knowledge. On the other hand, it reduces the
importance of knowledge spillovers from abroad. Vice-versa, for the foreign country.
Since spillovers count only for a percentage Á in determining the productivity of
research, productivity of research will increase at home but it will fall abroad. Thus,
it will be more convenient to produce and to engage in research and development in
the domestic country rather than in the foreign country. b L is likely to increase, while
b L¤ is likely to decrease. Note that the equilibrium condition (4.1.4) implies that if
b b n
b b n
¤ increases b L¤ falls and b L augments.
In terms of the equilibrium growth rate equation (4.1.6), the growth rate depends
positively on labour employed in the …rst-class good sector in the home country and
abroad (if b L and b L¤ increase b L + b L¤ and b Lb L¤ in equation (4.1.6) increase too) and
on the gap between the level of labour employed in this sector between the two
countries (i.e. growth increases if b L¡ b L¤ increases). Ceteris paribus21, specialisation
according to the home market comparative advantage implies that labour employed
in the manufacturing of …rst-class goods will increase in the country with the larger
domestic demand for that class of goods, but it will decrease in the other country;
b L ¡ b L¤ will increase and this has a positive e¤ect on the growth rate. However, we
do not know what is the e¤ect of specialisation on b Lb L¤:22
Simulations suggest that the overall e¤ect of specialisation according to the home
market advantage is positive. However, when transport costs fall to zero, the growth
rate falls below the growth rate characterising a world where there are positive trans-
21i.e. for a given b L + b L¤.
22Note that b Lb L¤ increases only if the elasticity of b L¤ to b L is less than 1.
28port costs. This is due to the fact that, when trade is free, the home market e¤ect
disappears.
Second, when transport costs are large enough (¿ > 1:05 approximately in the
…gure) and under free trade countries grow at a rate that falls in between the growth
rates they would experience if they traded with a symmetric partner. The reason is
as follows. When trade costs are high (like also when countries trade with similar
partners and under free trade) each country produces a proportion of varieties of
…rst and second-class goods equal (or close) to its demand. In these circumstances,
if a country, say the foreign country, trades with a country that has a comparative
advantage in the progressive sector, it will bene…t from larger knowledge spillovers
than if it traded with a similar partner. Larger spillovers lead to higher growth; thus,
its growth rate will be larger than in the case of trade with a similar country. Vice-
versa, the country with the comparative advantage will bene…t from less spillovers
than when it trades with a similar partner; thus, the growth rate will be lower that
in the case of the domestic country trading with a similar country.
Similarly, the free trade growth rate, equal to2:64; falls within the range, [2:51;2:76],
bounded by the growth rates that the domestic country and the foreign country, re-
spectively, would realise if they traded with a similar country.
However, when transport costs are low, the worldwide growth rate for two coun-
tries with di¤erent preferences for the …rst-class good sector increases above the
growth rate of symmetric countries with a large market for the progressive good.
This is because the positive knowledge e¤ect of specialisation o¤set the lower spillovers
from abroad.
Hereafter, we will examine how the extent of spillovers,the size of the market
access advantage, the elasticity of substitution between the di¤erentiated goods, the
level of the …xed cost, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the total market
29size a¤ect the growth rate. We will show that the non linear e¤ect of integration on
growth is a robust result; di¤erent values for the parameters of the model only have
level e¤ects.
Figure II shows the e¤ect of a low degree of knowledge spillovers between countries.
In these simulations the parameter Á is set equal to 0.1.23 The …gure shows two
important features. First, as predicted by most of endogenous growth literature, lower
spillovers reduce the growth rate. The growth rate rises from 1.6 to 2.6 as transport
costs fall, remaining below the growth rate obtained with Á = 0:7 at any level of
the transport cost. The reason is that lower spillovers decrease the productivity of
research, thus reducing …rms’ incentive to innovate.
Second, integration has a larger positive e¤ect on the growth rate. When Á =
0:1; the growth rate increases more than when Á = 0:7: This is because when the
percentage of knowledge that spills over from abroad is very low, the negative e¤ect
of specialisation on the growth rate (due to the fact that knowledge developed in the
country with the home market advantage in the non-progressive sector decreases) is
negligible.
Note that when spillovers tend to zero, our model predicts that the growth rate
is given by the level of employment in the sector producing …rst-class goods in the
country where it is higher.24 Therefore, in this case specialisation has only a positive
e¤ect on growth.
23Simulations have been run for value of 0:09 < Á ￿ 1:
24Recall that when Á ! 0 , g ! [maxfb L; b L¤g ¡ (" ¡ 1)½]=".
30Figure III shows the impact of a larger home market advantage in the production
of …rst-class goods for the domestic country (in particular, it is now assumed that
± = 0:75 and ±
¤ = 0:4525). It appears that a larger home market advantage increases
the growth rate. The values of the growth rate range from 2.88 to 3.08. This is
because when the home market comparative advantage is larger the specialisation
e¤ect is larger. A higher proportion of the production of second-class goods will
concentrate in the foreign country. Consequently, more labour will be available in
the domestic country for the production of …rst-class goods. This positive e¤ect of
specialisation on the worldwide rate of innovation outweighs the negative e¤ect due
to the lower level of research undertaken in the foreign country.
25These values have been chosen, in order to leave the average between ± and ±
¤ unaltered.
31As far as the rest of the parameter of the model are concerned, simulations run over
a wide range of values for the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods
show that the higher the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods, the
lower the rate of growth is. This is because a higher elasticity of substitution reduces
the returns to innovation by reducing price mark-ups.
Simulation run for di¤erent values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
show that a lower value of ½ increases the growth rate. The reason is that the lower
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the less heavily future consumption is
discounted. Therefore, the more welfare-enhancing is a high growth rate.
In contrast, di¤erent values of the …xed cost in the second-class sector do not
appear to a¤ect the growth rate to any signi…cant extent. This is because there is
a negative relationship between the number of …rms producing second-class goods
and the level of …xed cost. When the …xed cost is higher less …rms will enter in the
32market. These two e¤ects cancel out.
Finally, larger market size (higher values of the total labour force inboth countries)
increases the growth rate; a relative larger market for the di¤erentiated good sector
with respect to the homogeneous good sector (higher values for ®) also has a positive
e¤ect on the growth rate.
To sum up, when countries’ preferences over the di¤erentiated goods di¤er and
transport costs impede free exchange of commodities, trade leads countries to spe-
cialise according to their home market comparative advantage. Countries will become
net exporter of the commodity for which they have a larger domestic demand. In these
circumstances, transportation costs matter for the determination of the allocation of
labour between sectors. Thus, they a¤ect the growth rate.
We found that trade liberalisation has a positive e¤ect on growth. However there
is a discontinuity at free trade. When transport costs fall to zero the growth rate falls
too. Moreover, countries with a large market for the progressive sector may bene…t
more from integrating with a country with a smaller market for it than with a country
with similar preferences.
In addition, we found that the e¤ect of integration on growth is positively cor-
related to the size of the home market advantage but negatively correlated to the
extent of spillovers.
3 Conclusions
Traditional growth literature about the impact of integration on growth focuses on
its scale, competition, spillover and allocation e¤ects. In particular, the allocation
e¤ect occurs when one of the two (usually) integrating countries has a comparative
advantage (a la Ricardo or a la Heckhscher-Ohlin) in the production of one of the
(usually two) sectors of the economy. So that, each country specialises in the produc-
33tion of the good for which it has a comparative advantage. In these circumstances,
if spillovers are national in scope, integration favours (in terms of growth rate) the
country which specialises in the progressive sector.
In this paper we highlight a further factor that might a¤ect the impact of inte-
gration on growth: the home market e¤ect.
We assume a two-country two-sector world, where there are spillovers between
countries. There are two types of di¤erentiated good whose production technology
exhibits IRS: …rst and second-class goods. However, innovation takes place only in
…rst-class goods.
We show that, if countries share similar tastes over the di¤erentiated good, trans-
portation costs have no e¤ects on the growth rate. Whilst, when countries’ preferences
di¤er over the two types of di¤erentiated goods, integration has a positive e¤ect on
growth. Yet, there is a discontinuity at free trade. This pattern is the result of
specialisation according to the home market comparative advantage.
When countries open up to trade, production will concentrate in the country
with the home market advantage, i.e. there is a specialisation e¤ect. The e¤ect
of specialisation on growth is twofold. On the one hand, there is a positive e¤ect
of specialisation on growth due to the enlargement of …rst-class good sector in the
domestic country. On the other hand, there is a negative e¤ect of specialisation
on growth due to the decline of the …rst-class goods sector abroad. Since spillovers
from abroad only count for a percentage towards the determination of a country’s
knowledge, the former e¤ect outweighs the latter. Thus, as transport costs fall,
countries specialise and the growth rate increases. However, when transport costs
fall to zero the growth rate falls too. Free trade removes …rms’ advantage to locate
in the country with the larger domestic market. Firms randomise between countries,
so the positive e¤ect of concentration on growth disappears.
34Furthermore, we show that when countries with di¤erent preferences over inno-
vative and second generation type of goods integrate, there will be a stage of the
integration process when their growth rate will increase above the growth rate that
each of the two countries could realise, if it integrates with a country with similar pref-
erences. We also show that for a given world demand for …rst-class goods, the e¤ect
of integration on the growth rate is greater, when countries di¤erences in preferences
is larger and when the degree of spillovers between countries is smaller.
In conclusion, this paper suggests that the e¤ect of integration on growth depends
on the degree of advancement of the integration process and on a country’s speci…c
circumstances (such as trading countries’ relative market size). In contrast, so far
empirical literature on the e¤ects of integration has assumed that openness must
have the same e¤ects across countries regardless of circumstances. Further empirical
research in this direction is therefore needed.
A Appendix: The steady-state growth rate of wages
In order to show that the steady-state growth rate of wages equals zero (
¢ w
w
= 0), it will
be su¢cient to show that
¢ p
p
= 0 in steady state. This is because under monopolistic
competition
¢ p
p
=
¢ w
w
:
Given the equation for the optimal time path of consumption
:
e C
e C
+
:
e P
e P
= r ¡ ½;
normalisation of prices at any point in time so that expenditure remains constant
implies that r = ½ for the domestic country, and similarly for the foreign country.
Therefore, r = r¤: It also implies that:
:
e C
e C
= ¡
:
e P
e P
(A.1)
From equation (1.4), (1.9) and (1.13) taking logarithms and di¤erentiating with
35respect to time yields:
:
e C
e C
= ®°
¢
b C
b C
(A.2)
where
¢
b C
b C
=
:
b c
b c
+
1
µ
g + g¤n¤
n
¿¡"µ
(1 + ¿¡"µn¤
n
)
(A.3)
In steady state g = g¤ = g: Substituting (A.3) into (A.2) and using the equality
:
b c
b c
= ¡g; we can rewrite the steady state growth rate of consumption in the domestic
country as:
:
e C
e C
= ®°
1
1 ¡ "
g (A.4)
Similarly, it can be shown that
:
e P
e P
=
¢ p
p
+ ®°
1 ¡ µ
µ
g (A.5)
Together (A.1), (A.4) and (A.5) imply that
¢ p
p
= 0:
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